A state can compel its people to obey through force for a time, but it cannot win their trust through force alone. The imposition of emergency rule and Governor’s Rule in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has raised a fundamental question about democracy in Pakistan, its federal structure, and the relationship between the state and its people: Is weakening democratic institutions in the name of peace really a solution to the crisis, or could it deepen the crisis itself?

On 11 October 2026, the President of Pakistan announced the imposition of emergency rule and Governor’s Rule in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The federal government linked the move to rising terrorism and the provincial government’s alleged lack of cooperation in counterterrorism matters, while the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) described it as a political measure and challenged it. On 15 October, a joint sitting of Parliament approved these proclamations.

Meanwhile, on 13 October, a protest in Bara Tehsil, Khyber District turned violent. According to newspaper reports, clashes broke out between protesters and police, public property was damaged, and protesters were injured. Reports of police firing also emerged. These incidents require an impartial investigation. Peaceful protest is a democratic right, but violence and attacks on public property are also condemnable. Similarly, the unnecessary use of state force is contrary to democratic principles.

History shows the price states pay when disputes are met with force instead of consent. In 1971, the refusal to honour the result of the 1970 election and the military operation in East Pakistan led to the country’s breakup. In Yugoslavia, economic crisis, rising nationalism and weakened federal institutions after Tito’s death left a center unable to hold its republics together, and repression only deepened the fracture.

In the Soviet Union, the failed hardliner coup of August 1991 destroyed what authority the central government had left, and within months the union dissolved. These states were very different: one was ruled by the military, the others by single-party systems. Yet the lesson is the same. Whether a state is democratic or not, once its center is weakened and loses the trust of its constituent units, the consequences are severe: unrest, secession and, in the worst cases, collapse. Force may delay this outcome, but it cannot prevent it. These examples are not predictions for Pakistan, but ignoring them would be a historical mistake.

In When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, Robert I. Rotberg links state strength not merely to the use of force, but also to the provision of security, justice, and basic services. Similarly, in How Democracies Die, Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt explain that democracy does not decline only through military coups; it can also erode gradually through the weakening of institutions and the erosion of checks on executive power. In Pakistan, democracy has been undermined not only by military dictatorships but also by the authoritarian practices of elected governments.

The real danger is the weakening of the federation. If provinces lose trust in the federation, refuse to cooperate with one another, and disputes over resource distribution intensify, federalism itself comes under question. When ethnic and regional grievances cause people to become alienated from the state, both state authority and political unity can be affected. Pakistan must avoid a situation in which persistent repression, political deprivation, and mistrust make the federation increasingly difficult to hold together. Rather than weakening provincial autonomy, the country needs to strengthen constitutional federalism, political dialogue, and the equitable distribution of resources.

PTI, too, has repeatedly demonstrated political immaturity and a confrontational approach. However, a political party’s mistakes cannot justify undermining its popular mandate. When a hybrid system renders the people’s electoral choice ineffective, democracy is further weakened. Holding elections is not enough; genuine democracy requires respect for the people’s verdict and accountability across all centres of power.

Class struggle, movements for freedom of expression, and campaigns for fundamental rights do not disappear through government orders. Authoritarianism may suppress them temporarily, but it cannot eliminate their underlying causes. The state would be better served by correcting its course and avoiding measures that could make future political instability and the federal crisis even more severe.

Another important aspect of this crisis is control over natural resources. Global interest in Pakistan’s mineral wealth is growing. Geological surveys conducted in the 1960s by the United States Geological Survey provided estimates of the value of Pakistan’s mineral resources, but their potential value today may be considerably higher. In a recent podcast statement attributed to Natalie Baker, the US Chargé d’Affaires in Pakistan, the potential value of Pakistan’s critical minerals was reportedly estimated at seven trillion dollars.

According to the statement attributed to her, one important reason for improving relations between Pakistan and the United States is growing American interest in critical minerals. These statements and estimates require independent verification. Nevertheless, the fundamental questions remain: Who will control these resources? Who will benefit from the wealth they generate? And what share will go to the local population?

If mineral extraction accelerates following the imposition of emergency rule and Governor’s Rule, the need for transparency, local participation, and the fair distribution of benefits will become even more important. A temporal connection alone does not prove that these measures were introduced to facilitate resource extraction. However, the public has the right to question state policy and the use of natural resources. When the populations of resource-rich regions continue to suffer economic deprivation while others benefit from their wealth, the fundamental contradictions of political economy become even more pronounced.

From a socialist perspective, the solution to these contradictions lies not merely in changing those who govern, but in the equitable distribution of political power and economic resources. Education, healthcare, employment, workers’ and peasants’ rights, local autonomy, and meaningful public participation in decision-making are the foundations of lasting peace. Pakistan has experimented with various authoritarian, civilian, and hybrid systems, yet problems of political deprivation, economic inequality, and public accountability persist.

Pakistan needs not merely a change of rulers, but a transformation of the democratic and economic foundations of the system. The way forward is socialist democracy, in which political freedoms and pluralism are accompanied by democratic control over resources, equitable wealth distribution, a reduction in class exploitation, and meaningful public participation in decision-making. No alternative system can deliver genuine freedom without protecting civil liberties and ensuring public accountability.

The question today is not which political party should remain in power, but whether the state will respect the popular mandate, provincial autonomy, and fundamental rights. Will emergency rule and Governor’s Rule help effectively combat terrorism and restore public trust, or will they deepen political alienation and weaken the federation? The true strength of a state lies not in repression, but in its ability to provide people with security, dignity, economic justice, and the power to shape their own destiny.